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Contemporary developments in repro-
ductive technology hold great promise
for those who have difficulty conceiv-
ing naturally. However, they have
generated extensive debate among
lawyers, ethicists, legislators, the me-
dia, and the public. Concern has
intensified recently in light of claimed
attempts to clone human beings. One
implication of the new reproductive
technologies upon which few com-
mentators have focused is their effect
on inheritance rights and on the noto-
rious Rule Against Perpetuities. For
example, what impact should the pos-
sible existence of frozen sperm or
frozen embryos have upon the execu-
tion of wills and implementation of the
Rule? If one leaves property to one's
children but has frozen sperm or em-
bryos that might produce children
decades after one's death, what should
be done about the distribution of the
estate? These difficult questions can no
longer be ignored. Because some states
apply the Rule to commercial contracts
such as options, as well as wills, the
development of the new reproductive
technologies could have impacts in a
wide spectrum of legal arenas.
The Rule Against Perpetuities
The Rule Against Perpetuities has long
terrorized law students and lawyers
alike, despite its deceptively simple
language: "no interest is good unless
it must vest, if at all, not later than
twenty-one years after some life in
being at the creation of the interest."'
To illustrate the basic rule, con-
sider T's will that leaves Blackacre "to
my son A, and then to my first grand-
child to reach twenty-five." The
contingent remainder following A's life
estate violates the common law Rule
even if T's oldest grandchild is 24 at
the time of his death, because the re-
mainder might vest more than twenty-
one years from the death of the
relevant lives-in-being. To demonstrate,
suppose all living grandchildren die
and a new grandchild is born after T's
death. A then dies before the new
grandchild reaches age four. The
grandchild's interest could not vest
until more than twenty-one years later.
The gift is therefore void, since only T,
A, and the grandchild who is alive at
the time of T's death can be used as
lives-in-being. Violation of the Rule
results in striking the relevant interest,
which leads to receipt of the property
in question by someone else, to whom
the grantor did not intend to convey
the property. Because the Rule is a rule
of logical possibility, not likely prob-
abilities, the mere existence of the new
reproductive technologies, which of-
fer the opportunity for post-mortem
conception, threatens to make many





Several technologies that have been
developed during the last several
decades raise the possibility of post-
humous reproduction. They are briefly
described below.
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Cryopreservation of Semen
Cryopreservation is the preservation of
biological material, such as semen, at
very low temperatures. 3 The semen
remains viable after thawing and can
be used for artificial insemination. Se-
men can be preserved by freezing for
an unlimited amount of time.4 Conse-
quently, a man might father a child
years or even decades after his death.
Some men freeze sperm in order to
donate it to a stranger, while others
do so for their own purposes, such as
in anticipation of fertility-jeopardizing
medical treatment or for use during in
vitro fertilization procedures.
Posthumous reproduction can be
achieved even in cases where a man
did not store semen while he was alive.
Contemporary medical technology
makes it possible for physicians to re-
trieve sperm from a deceased male
within twenty-four hours of his death.5
In the United States an increasing num-
ber of requests for postmortem sperm
retrieval are being made by wives, other
family members, fiancees, and friends.'
'Several courts have already been
called upon to grapple with the inher-
itance rights of children conceived from
their dead father's frozen spenn. In 2002
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts ruled that the children could
inherit if their mother proved the
descendant's paternity and established
that he had agreed to reproduce post-
humously and to support children that
had been conceived from his sperm.7
That same year, a federal district court
in Arizona held that under Arizona in-
testacy laws, children conceived after
their father's death did not "survive" him
and could not inherit under state law.'
Surely, these are only the earliest of
many similar cases that will come be-
fore the courts in future years.
Cryopreservation of Embryos
The first pregnancy resulting from a
frozen embryo was reported in Aus-
tralia in 1983.9 Today approximately
400,000 frozen embryos exist in stor-
age facilities in the United States
alone." By some estimates, contem-
porary technology would allow for the
safe storage of embryos for fifty years
or longer." Consequently, children
could be born many decades after one
or both of their genetic parents died.
Cryopreservation of Ovum
Cryopreservation of mature, unfertil-
ized eggs is not standard clinical
practice at the present time."2 The
mature egg's high liquid content and
size make it particularly difficult to
freeze, and sperm have generally
proven unable to penetrate previously
frozen and thawed oocytes. 13
Nevertheless, ovum cryopreser-
vation is a developing reproductive
technology that has already proven
successful in isolated instances. 4 Some
predict that in the future, ovum pres-
ervation combined with semen
freezing might replace the
cryopreservation of embryos since
destruction of gametes that have not
been joined to form an embryo will
not raise difficult moral and ethical
quandaries. 5 After fertilization, the
embryos could be implanted either in
the egg donor or in another woman.
Consequently, the freezing of eggs, like
frozen embryo storage, could lead to
the birth of children long after one or
both genetic parents are dead.
Cloning
Cloning is the most controversial of
the new reproductive technologies,
and it is yet another mechanism that
could enable individuals to reproduce
posthumously. Posthumous cloning
would be achieved by the insertion of
the nucleus of a preserved somatic
cell 16 from a deceased individual into
an egg that has had its nucleus re-
moved.17 The egg would then develop
into an embryo whose genetic makeup
would be nearly identical to that of
the deceased. 8 The somatic cell pro-
vider may be unrelated to the egg
donor and the gestational mother, and
thus three different individuals may
biologically contribute to the birth of
the child.19
Scientists have already begun ex-
perimenting with the cloning of
early-stage human embryos." Despite
the initial outcry against the idea of
human cloning,2 cloning may well
become an accepted reproductive
technology in the future, and some
commentators view this development
as inevitable.22
Summary
Advances in reproductive technology
are an established part of the medical
landscape. No longer merely the
subject of science fiction, new repro-
ductive technologies are more
commonly available each year. As
these technologies become wide-
spread, the law will need to recognize
their existence and consider their im-
pact on legal rules and institutions.
Much as family law earlier evolved to
include adopted and born-out-of-wed-
lock children within the legal definition
of children,23 so too will property law
need to address the reality of posthu-
mously conceived children. Since at
least some of these children will be
"planned" posthumous births, simply
excluding all such children as heirs
by definition, as was done with those
born out-of-wedlock in earlier times,
is unacceptable.
Recommendation
We propose that if the deceased did
not explicitly provide in the will for
posthumous children, there should be
a rebuttable presumption that the will
contains an implicit statement that
"nothing in this will shall be construed
to provide an inheritance for any post-
humously born children." This
presumption can be rebutted by evi-
dence showing that the deceased
intended at the time of his or her death
to provide for posthumously born
children but had not yet made such
provisions prior to his or her death.
For example, suppose two
couples, Amy and Allen and Barb and
Ben, created frozen embryos. Allen and
Ben were then killed in a car accident
on October 15th. Prior to the accident,
Amy and Allen had made an appoint-
ment with their attorney for October
30tl. When they scheduled the meet-
ing, they informed the lawyer that they
wished to revise their wills to provide
for children who are the products of
their stored embryos, even if they are
born posthumously. Ben and Barb had
no similar conversation with their at-
torney or anyone else concerning their
wills. Amy and Barb both choose to
implant the embryos in their wombs.
Even though his will had not actually
been changed, Allen's intent could be
proved based on his discussion with
his attorney, and thus, a gift in his will
to "my children" would be read to
include the children born from the
frozen embryos. Since there is no
provable intent in Ben's case, his gift
to "my children" would not include
the posthumous children.
Conclusion
Inheritance problems raised by the
new reproductive technologies call for
legislative intervention in the irnmuedi-
ate future. Adopting our proposed
solution would give courts a method
for answering these challenging ques-
tions when they inevitably arise.
Alternatively, a comprehensive revision
of parentage laws, intestacy laws, and
estate laws to consider the impact of
the new reproductive technologies
could produce other, more effective
means of addressing the concerns of
the Rule Against Perpetuities and elimi-
nate the need for a piecemeal reform
and, perhaps, for the Rule itself. How-
ever, given the contentious nature of
the debate over reproductive and fam-
ily issues generally, and over cloning
in particular, we are not optimistic that
any such reform will take place soon
enough to eliminate the need for our
approach. The problems that the new
reproductive technologies cause for the
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Rule Against Perpetuities are instruc-
tive in that they establish that advances
in medical technology require periodic
reexamination of legal rules in a wide
range of areas of the law.
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